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ESSAY 
 
SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS, CORRUPTION,  
AND THE PROXY WAR OVER COORDINATION 
 
RICHARD L. HASEN* 
 
I. WHY LIMIT SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS? 
 
In 1995, journalist and supply-side economics enthusiast Jude Wanniski 
wrote an op-ed in the New York Times noting the anomaly that under the Supreme 
Court’s campaign finance rulings,1 billionaire Steve Forbes could spend $25 
million (or any amount) supporting his own candidacy to be president, but he 
could donate only $1,000 to Jack Kemp’s presidential campaign.2 Forbes believed 
Kemp would have been a more effective candidate to promote Forbes’ views, and 
Wanniski suggested that Forbes should have been able to give $25 million directly 
to Kemp to bankroll a Kemp candidacy.3  
Wanniski saw nothing wrong with Forbes giving Kemp so much money: 
“Wouldn’t we expect President Kemp, with his $25 million check from Mr. 
Forbes to take a call from him sooner than from, say, Mr. Business Week? But so 
what? His views are closer to Forbe’s than to Business Week’s, with or without 
campaign contributions.”4 
Wanniski’s views appear to be in the minority, at least judged by 
longstanding laws imposing individual contribution limitations in federal 
                                                                                                    
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law.  
1 The modern era begins with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (2014). On Buckley’s key holdings, see 
RICHARD L. HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES 
AND EXPLANATIONS ch. 13 (forthcoming 2014); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, & 
DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 14 (5th ed. 2012). 
2 Jude Wanniski, Bowing for Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995. For my response, see Richard 
L. Hasen, Letter to the Editor, Let’s Not Auction Off Political Access, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/04/opinion/l-let-s-not-auction-off-political-access-037320.html.   
3 Wanniski, supra note 2 (“Why is my good friend Steve Forbes leaving the comfort of his 
publishing empire for the rough-and-tumble of Presidential politics? Because his idol, Jack Kemp, 
decided he did not have the stomach to raise $25 million at $1,00) a pop, an ordeal that would 
require him to make a thousand promises he knew he could not keep. On CNN’s ‘Capital Gang’ 
recently, Mr. Kemp acknowledged that he would be running if Mr. Forbes could supply $25 
million. On CNN’s ‘Evans and Novak’ earlier the same day, Mr. Forbes acknowledged that he 
would not be running if Mr. Kemp were in the race.”). 
4 Id. 
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elections as well as in many state and local elections. The 2002 Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA, more commonly known as “McCain-Feingold”) 
doubled the very modest $1,000 individual contribution limitation from the 1974 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments to $2000 and indexed the limits to 
inflation;5 in the 2014 election season the amount will be $2,600 per election, 
meaning a citizen can give a congressional candidate $5,200 (once for the primary 
and once for the general election).6 That individual limit nonetheless coexists with 
very high spending by federal, especially presidential, campaigns. In the 2012 
election, for example, both Democratic candidate Barack Obama and Republican 
candidate Mitt Romney (along with affiliated party committees) raised above $1 
billion each.7 Candidates are raising a lot of money in contributions of $5,200 or 
less. 
Consider four reasons why supporters of contribution limits may favor 
them and oppose Wanniski’s suggestion to allow an individual to give a candidate 
for public office $25 million or more. 
 
1. Individual contribution limits deter bribery (the “antibribery 
interest”). While I believe Jack Kemp would not have been bribable even 
for $25 million and Forbes would not be attempting a bribe even if he gave 
Kemp $25 million, there are many more unscrupulous politicians out there 
who could be bribed for much less. For example, a New York State 
Assembly Member was just convicted for taking a mere $22,000 bribe in 
exchange for taking favorable actions related to an adult day care center.8 
Bribery is very difficult to detect because people who are bribed want to 
keep it a secret. But bribery would be much easier if very large campaign 
contributions were legal. As things stand now, unscrupulous individuals 
wanting to engage in a bribery transaction need to hide both the agreement 
and the payments. With unlimited contributions allowed, the only thing 
                                                                                                    
5 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A). 
6 Federal Election Commission, Contribution Limits 2013-2014, 
http://fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimitschart.htm.  
7 HASEN, supra note 1, ch. 16; Campaign Finance Institute, Aggregated Individual Contributions 
by Donors to 2012 Presidential Candidates Presidential Campaign, National Party, and Joint 
Committee Fundraising, 
 http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/president/2012/Presidential%20Fundraising%20byCommittee_2
012.pdf. Contributions to state and national political parties are subject to higher individual limits. 
See Federal Election Commission, supra note 6. 
8 John Herzfeld, Jury Convicts N.Y. State Legislator on Charges of Trading Favors for Bribes, 
BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY & POLITICS RPT, Jan. 15, 2014, 
http://news.bna.com/mpdm/MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=39901945&vname=mpebulalliss
ues&fn=39901945&jd=39901945.  
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that conspirators would need to hide is the agreement: “I will give you $25 
million and in exchange you will support legislation for a tax break which 
will save me $1 Billion.” By keeping individual contributions limits low, 
there is not enough money at stake in campaign contributions for a 
politician to be bought and unscrupulous individuals need to take steps to 
hide the money. 
2.  Individual contribution limits prevent undue influence and 
conflicts of interest (the “anti-undue influence” interest). Some 
supporters of limits worry not just about outright bribery, but also that, 
thanks to human nature and feelings of reciprocity, candidates who receive 
extremely large contributions will feel grateful to large donors and will 
take legislative and other steps to favor the donors. This happens not 
through any quid pro quo exchange but instead through norms of 
reciprocity. The human mind being as it is, it is quite easy for people to 
rationalize taking actions consistent with their own self interest. As Dan 
Lowenstein observed long ago, candidates who can take very large 
campaign contributions from those who have business before the 
candidate have an inherent conflict of interest.9 At the very least, large 
contributions can buy access, giving the large donor much more influence 
over an elected official’s thinking and agenda than the typical voter. 
3. Individual contribution limits promote political equality by 
limiting the sale of access and disproportionate influence over election 
outcomes (the “equality” interest). Wanniski pooh-poohed the objection 
that Kemp would take Forbes’ phone calls first, reasoning that Kemp 
would have done that without the contribution, and that because Kemp’s 
ideology lined up with Forbes’ ideology, the extra access would make no 
difference in policy. That may well be true of the Kemp-Forbes 
relationship, but it may not be true for many large donors. To use the 
earlier example, a donor might give $25 million to a candidate not because 
the donor agrees with the candidate’s ideology, but because the donor 
hopes it will give the candidate access to make a pitch for a $1 billion tax 
cut. To some this access as unfair, because only the large donor gets to 
make the pitch for the tax cut while those on the other side would be much 
less likely to get the access. Further, there is a separate equality concern: 
the $25 million contribution could make it more likely that the candidate 
gets elected, and that means that the large donor has a bigger say over the 
                                                                                                    
9 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 
18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989). 
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outcome of the election than others who feel just as passionately but lack 
the same funds to support the candidates of their choice. 
4. Individual contribution limits could promote public confidence 
in the electoral process by reducing the appearance of corruption or 
the appearance of inequality (the “public confidence” interest). If the 
public believes that large donors are bribing candidates, large donors have 
undue influence over candidates/elected officials, large donors have unfair 
access to candidates/elected officials, or large donors have 
disproportionate influence over the outcome of elections, the public could 
lose confidence in the fairness of the electoral process. 
 
Opponents of strong campaign regulation contest these points on empirical 
grounds, normative grounds, or both. While virtually no one supports bribery of 
elected officials, some contend that outright bribery is rare, based on the number 
of prosecutions, and bribery would not rise appreciably with very large legal 
campaign contributions.10 While campaign contributions are valuable to 
candidates, they may not be nearly as valuable to unscrupulous politicians as piles 
of cash in the freezer11 or a new yacht.12  
Some believe undue influence or the sale of access should not count as 
corruption, and all that the law should do is prevent actual quid pro quo 
corruption or its appearance.13 Some reject political equality as a legitimate reason 
for limiting campaign contributions.14 The relationship between money spent on 
elections and electoral outcomes is complicated.15 Finally, empirical evidence 
                                                                                                    
10 Stephen A. Ansolabehere, The Scope of Corruption: Lessons from Comparative Campaign 
Finance Disclosure, 6 ELECTION L.J. 163, 175 (2006). 
11 Jerry Markon, Ex-Rep. Jefferson Gets 13 Years in Freezer Cash Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 
2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-11-14/news/36786791_1_william-j-jefferson-
prison-term-robert-p-trout. 
12 Bill Campbell, Former Rep ‘Duke’ Cunningham Freed After Bribery Conviction, NPR News, 
Jun. 4, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/04/188667106/former-rep-duke-
cunningham-freed-after-bribery-sentence. But it is important not to underestimate how much 
personal value candidates and elected officials can get out of campaign contributions, including 
luxury locations with lobbyists and fundraisers. See Eric Lipton, A Loophole Allows Lawmakers to 
Reel in Trips and Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/us/politics/a-loophole-allows-lawmakers-to-reel-in-trips-and-
donations.html?hp&_r=0.  
13 Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 615 (2013). 
14 BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH (2003). 
15 For a summary, see LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 1, at 676-80. 
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casts serious doubts on any relationship between campaign finance laws and 
public confidence in the government or the electoral process.16 
I will return to these objections and related constitutional issues shortly, 
but before I do, I want to contrast Wanniski’s Forbes-Kemp scenario with two 
other relationships involving rich donors and presidential candidates.  
In 2004, liberal financier George Soros wanted to help defeat Republican 
President George W. Bush, who was running for reelection. Soros could give only 
a few thousand dollars directly to the campaign of Democrat John Kerry, who was 
running against Bush. But Soros gave approximately $27 million to other 
organizations which promoted Kerry’s candidacy.17At the time, federal law 
provided that an individual could not give more than $5,000 to a political 
committee supporting candidates for federal office. But Soros gave millions to a 
group called “Americans Coming Together” (“ACT”),18 which was a political 
organization organized under section 527 of the tax code, and which argued that 
even though it was running ads attacking Bush and supporting Kerry, and even 
though the organization was headed by Kerry’s former campaign manager, the 
group was not a political committee and therefore not bound by the $5,000 
individual contribution limitation. There was no evidence the group coordinated 
with Kerry’s campaign, but it did mimic his advertising and augment his 
campaign strategy. A few years after the election, the Federal Election 
Commission determined that ACT violated the law, imposed a $775,000 fine, and 
decided it should have registered as a political committee because its major 
purpose was to elect a federal candidate. It should not have accepted contributions 
exceeding $5,000 from individuals.19 
Those with serious concerns about Soros giving $27 million directly to 
Kerry would have similar concerns about Soros giving the same amount to 
independent groups with close personal ties to Kerry. Again, while I have no 
                                                                                                    
16 Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When 
Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004).  
17 Weekend Edition Saturday, George Soros, Maintaining Political Interest, NPR News, Jun. 10, 
2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5476317.  
18 Thomas B. Edsall, Soros-Backed Activist Group Disbands as Interest Fades, WASH. POST, Aug. 
3, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080201849.html (“Soros and his close associate—
Progressive Corp. Chairman Peter Lewis—together put $38.5 million into ACT and the Media 
Fund. With this seed money, the two organizations collected $196.4 million, enough to set up voter 
mobilization programs in every presidential battleground state and to flood the airwaves with pro-
Democratic commercials in the early spring of 2004 when Kerry’s campaign was broke.”). 
19 Kenneth P. Vogel, Soros-Linked Group Hit with Huge Fine, POLITICO, Aug. 29, 2007, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0807/5555.html; Federal Election Commission, News 
Release, FEC to Collect $775,000 Civil Penalty from Americans Coming Together, Aug. 29, 2007, 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2007/20070829act.shtml.  
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reason to doubt the honesty of Kerry and Soros, unscrupulous donors and 
candidates could agree to a bribe, with the money going to a group committed to 
doing everything to elect the candidate. That committee need not even know about 
the bribe; it is certainly not required that there be “bargaining opportunities” 
involving the outside group.20 The other interests noted for limiting contributions 
to candidates are in play as well: a large donor to an independent group could well 
have undue influence over the candidate, even if the financial support is 
marginally attenuated; the large donor to the independent group is likely to get 
special access to the candidate and the large contribution could have an outsized 
influence on the election campaign; and the public’s confidence could be shaken 
by a large contribution to an independent group with close ties to the candidate. 
All of these arguments are somewhat lessened by the independence of the outside 
group, but they are still present. 
The final scenario concerns the 2012 election, and the campaign 
contributions of conservative casino magnate Sheldon Adelson related to the 2012 
presidential election. By the time of the 2012 election, the Supreme Court had 
decided Citizens United v. FEC,21 allowing independent corporate spending in 
elections, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
had decided SpeechNow.Org v. FEC, allowing individuals to give unlimited sums 
to political committees which make only independent expenditures supporting or 
opposing candidates, and the Federal Election Commission issued two advisory 
opinions which allowed corporate and labor union contributions to these 
independent expenditure only committees,22 which became known as Super 
PACs. In the 2012 elections, all of the serious presidential candidates had single-
candidate Super PACs supporting them, with many headed by friends or former 
campaign associates of the candidates. Some Super PACs even took campaign 
contributions from the candidate’s family members. In essence, these Super PACs 
were the legal version of what ACT was trying to do back in 2004. 
Adelson gave unprecedented sums to Super PACs, first $20 million to 
“Winning Our Future,” the Super PAC supporting Republican Newt Gingrich in 
the Republican primaries, and then $30 million to “Restore Our Future,” the 
Super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s general election campaign against 
                                                                                                    
20 Cf. Smith, supra note 13, at 632 (“No bargaining opportunities arise unless [the Super PAC 
employee] has contact with the campaign or candidate post-Super PAC employment.”) 
21 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
22 SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sum nom Keating v. FEC, 
131 S.Ct. 553 (2010); FEC Adv. Op. 2010-09 (Club for Growth); FEC Adv. Op. 2010-11 
(Commonsense 10). 
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President Obama’s reelection.23 This was part of a $98 million to $150 million or 
more which Adelson and his wife contributed in the 2012 elections24—making 
Wanniski’s plea for $25 million to Kemp in 1996 seem quaint.  
Restore Our Future was headed by Charlie Spies, a close associate of Mitt 
Romney, and other Romney associates.25 There was no evidence Restore Our 
Future violated the rules on coordinating with the Romney campaign. But, 
consistent with FEC rulings, Romney was allowed to solicit funds (of no more 
than $5,000) for the independent group.26 (President Obama apparently did the 
same thing soliciting funds for Priorities USA, a pro-Obama Super PAC headed 
by Bill Burton, a former close associate of Obama.27) Restore Our Future 
complemented the Romney campaign’s strategy, and generally mimicked the 
campaign’s message. 
Once again, as with the Soros-Kerry connection, the Adelson-Romney 
connection raised similar concerns which would have been raised about a multi-
million dollar contribution from Adelson directly to Romney. To repeat, while I 
have no reason to doubt the honesty of Romney and Adelson, unscrupulous 
donors and candidates could agree to a bribe, with the money going to a group 
committed to doing everything to elect the candidate. Once again, there need be 
no bargaining involving the Super PAC directly. The anti-undue influence, 
political equality, and public confidence arguments are the same as in Soros-
Kerry. All of the arguments are somewhat lessened by the independence of the 
outside group compared to giving directly to the candidate, but they are still 
present.  
There is one additional concern about undue influence arising from Super 
PACs which is not present when it comes to direct contributions to candidates: a 
wealthy individual or entity could threaten to bankroll a large Super PAC working 
against an elected official up for reelection unless that official acts in ways which 
                                                                                                    
23 Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on Campaign 2012?, 
PROPUBLICA, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-did-sheldon-adelson-
really-spend-on-campaign-2012. 
24 Id. 
25 Factcheck.org, Restore Our Future, July 25, 2012, http://www.factcheck.org/2011/09/restore-
our-future/.  
26 Ryan J. Reilly, FEC: Politicians Can Solicit Donations for ‘Super PACs,’ But Only Up to 5K, 
TALKING POINTS MEMO, Jun. 30, 2011, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/fec-politicians-
can-solicit-donations-for-super-pacs-but-only-up-to-5k.  
27 Amanda Terkel & Sam Stein, Obama Broke Super PAC Pledge During Campaign, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/04/obama-super-
pac_n_4214466.html; Factcheck.org, Priorities U.S.A./Priorities USA Action, Aug. 6, 2012, 
http://www.factcheck.org/2011/09/priorities-usapriorities-usa-action/.  
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are more consistent with the wealthy individual or entity’s interests.28 Even 
without an explicit threat or quid pro quo, the potential for wealthy individuals or 
entities to bankroll opposition to an elected official’s campaign can influence the 
elected official’s actions. The threat is much more credible because the potential 
donor can threaten to give to an entity which can take unlimited contributions 
rather than simply giving the individual contribution limit to an opposing 
candidate’s campaign. 
The three examples demonstrate that the case for contribution limits to 
individual candidates looks very much like the case for contribution limits to 
independent groups, or at least to such groups which are closely aligned to the 
candidates and therefore are groups that donors and candidates would view as 
nearly as good as a direct contribution to a candidate. There remain some small 
differences between contributing directly to the candidate or giving to a 
supportive and reliable Super PAC backing the candidate, but in general the 
concerns about large contributions are parallel. 
 
 
II. SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTION LIMITS  
AND THE FIGHT OVER “CORRUPTION” 
 
In the last part I listed four different interests which could justify 
individual contribution limitations applied directly to candidates as well as to 
single-issue reliable Super PACs supporting candidates: the antibribery interest, 
the anti-undue influence interest, the political equality interest, and the public 
confidence interest. Whether these interests or others motivate those who support 
contribution interests, and the relative importance of each interest, is hard to say. 
But regardless of what motivates supporters of individual contribution limits, the 
Supreme Court has limited the permissibility of interests which may be weighed 
against the First Amendment rights of those who contribute and want to accept 
contributions. It also has required application of “exacting scrutiny” as the 
balancing test for judging the constitutionality of contribution limits. For this 
reason, only some arguments to sustain individual contribution limits will pass 
judicial muster. 
To sum up the matter briefly,29 the Supreme Court has accepted only the 
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption to justify 
                                                                                                    
28 Richard L. Hasen, The Biggest Danger of Super PACs, CNN Opinion, Jan. 9, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/09/opinion/hasen-super-pacs/index.html.  
29 For summaries, see HASEN, supra note 1, chs 14-15; LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 
1, chs. 12-14. 
SUPER PACS, CORRUPTION, COORDINATION 
 
 
9 
contribution limitations to candidates. Under an exacting scrutiny standard, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld contribution limitations applied in candidate 
elections, except in one instance when the Court held a limit was too low so as to 
prevent a candidate from being able to engage in effective advocacy.30 
The Supreme Court has not directly weighed the constitutionality of 
contribution limits to independent groups such as Super PACs.31 However, in the 
context of spending limits, in which the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny, 
the Court held in Citizens United that independent spending cannot corrupt or 
create the appearance of corruption.32 The D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow then held 
                                                                                                    
30 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006); see Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: 
Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849 (2007). 
31 Before Citizens United, there was some question whether the Court in a 1981 case, California 
Medical Association v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) had endorsed limitations on campaign 
contributions to independent expenditure committees and then reaffirmed the constitutionality of 
limits in McConnell v. FEC in its footnote 48. See Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New 
Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 31 (2004). 
32 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-61. Here is the key portion of that analysis: 
 
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo 
corruption. The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does 
not mean that these officials are corrupt: 
 
“Favoritism and influence are not ... avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature 
of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor 
the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a 
substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a 
contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by 
producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on 
responsiveness.” McConnell(opinion of KENNEDY, J.). 
 
Reliance on a “generic favoritism or influence theory ... is at odds with standard First 
Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle.”  
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose 
faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech presented 
to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any 
other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people 
have the ultimate influence over elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that 
the electorate will refuse to take part in democratic governance because of additional political 
speech made by a corporation or any other speaker…. 
The McConnell record was “over 100,000 pages” long, yet it “does not have any direct 
examples of votes being exchanged for ... expenditures,” This confirms Buckley 's reasoning 
that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo 
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that if independent spending cannot corrupt under Citizen United’s conception of 
corruption, then contributions to fund independent spending cannot corrupt 
either.33 
How can we square this analysis with the analysis in Part I, which showed 
that similar interests support individual contribution limits and limits on 
contributions to super PACs and other independent groups? Why reach divergent 
constitutional outcomes in the two cases? 
To begin with, we can take the third interest, political equality, interest off 
the table. Even if equalization is part of the motivation for supporters of 
contribution limitations, the Court in Buckley,34 FEC v. Davis,35 and Citizens 
United36 has rejected the interest. The rejection is all the stronger after Citizens 
United overturned cases obliquely embracing a political equality rationale in the 
context of corporate and labor union spending. Indeed, following the Court’s 
recent opinion in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett,37 
striking down the matching funds portion of Arizona’s public financing law, if 
political equality is even part of a law’s motivation, a law may violate the First 
Amendment. 
The divergence on the remaining three interests devolve into empirical and 
conceptual disputes.  
It is true the Supreme Court has said that the prevention of corruption or 
the appearance of corruption can justify contribution limits. The problem is what 
the Court means by “corruption,” a concept which has shifted over time. 
                                                                                                                                     
corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate. 
Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption. The BCRA record establishes that 
certain donations to political parties, called “soft money,” were made to gain access to elected 
officials. This case, however, is about independent expenditures, not soft money. When 
Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due deference; but Congress 
may not choose an unconstitutional remedy. If elected officials succumb to improper influences 
from independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put 
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. We must give weight to 
attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance or the reality of these influences. 
The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our 
law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule. An outright ban on 
corporate political speech during the critical preelection period is not a permissible remedy. 
Here Congress has created categorical bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid 
pro quo corruption. 
 
(Citations omitted and internal quotation marks altered). 
33 SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686. 
34 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). 
35 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
36 558 U.S. at 379-84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
37 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
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Empirically, Citizens United appears to establish as an uncontestable fact that 
independent spending cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption. I 
have been quite critical of this determination, because it does not allow for 
factfinders to consider a contrary conclusion based upon actual evidence.38 As 
Part I demonstrated, the potential for quid pro quo bribery appears nearly as 
strong when it comes to large contributions flowing to a reliable single candidate 
Super PAC staffed by close associates of the candidate and backed by the 
candidate’s friends and family as with contributions flowing to the candidate 
directly. Citizens United appears to exclude the possible bribery role of 
contributions to reliable Super, and if the Court reached the issue it likely would 
agree with the SpeechNow.Org court that contributions to fund independent 
spending cannot cause quid pro quo corruption any more than independent 
spending can do so. 
The parallel empirical issue arises with respect to the fourth interest, the 
public confidence interest. Again, as Part I demonstrated, the potential for the 
public to lose confidence in our system of government or the electoral process 
appears nearly as strong when it comes to large contributions flowing to a reliable 
single candidate Super PAC staffed by close associates of the candidate and 
backed by the candidate’s friends and family as with contributions flowing to the 
candidate directly. But once again, Citizens United appears to exclude the 
possibility of demonstrating with evidence that large contributions funding 
independent spending to a candidate’s reliable Super PAC can cause the public to 
lose confidence in government. 
This leaves the second interest, the undue influence interest. Recall the 
concern here is elected officials who are too compliant with the interests of 
donors, and affording access to those donors to make their case. Indeed, in the 
case of potential Super PAC donors, the undue influence concern may be greater 
because elected officials may be too compliant with the interests of potential 
Super PAC donors who may donate not to the candidate or a supportive Super 
PAC but against the candidate to an opposing Super PAC. This (sometimes 
implicit) threat could give those potential donors improper access.  
The problem with using undue influence as a form of corruption is 
conceptual and not (or not only) empirical. In a series of earlier contributions 
cases, most notably Shrink Missouri,39 the Supreme Court endorsed an undue 
influence theory of corruption, and relatedly an appearance of undue influence 
theory of the appearance of corruption.40 These cases, however, are in 
                                                                                                    
38 Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011). 
39 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382-83, 397-98 (2000). 
40 See Hasen, supra note 31; Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and “The 
Thing That Wouldn’t Leave,” 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 483 (2000). 
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considerable tension with Citizens United. Although the Citizens United Court 
was careful to say it was not saying anything about the constitutionality of 
contribution limits,41 it did reject the these earlier cases’ broad theory of 
corruption—at least in evaluating spending limits, concluding that ingratiation and 
access are not corruption.42 If undue influence is not a valid theory of corruption, 
and appearance of undue influence is not a valid theory of appearance of 
corruption, then it is hard to see the path toward sustaining contribution limits to 
Super PACs.  
To sum up, although the arguments for individual contribution limits 
applied to candidate campaign accounts and to single-candidate reliable Super 
PACs appear to be very close to each other and roughly similar in strength, current 
Supreme Court doctrine casts doubt upon the ability of litigants to make 
arguments for contribution limits applied to Super PACs. Part of the problem is 
empirical (rejection of the potential for quid pro quo corruption for contributions 
funding independent spending); part is conceptual (rejection of “undue influence” 
as a legitimate form of corruption); and part is normative (rejection of the political 
equality interest for limiting contributions). In short, it may take a change in 
Supreme Court personnel to sustain contribution limits in this area. 
 
III. THE COORDINATION PROXY WAR 
 
Savvy campaign finance reformers understand that the Citizens 
United/SpeechNow.Org reading of the meaning of corruption makes it difficult 
under current doctrine to sustain contribution limitations for Super PACs and 
other independent expenditure committees. This roadblock has caused some 
supporters to seek an alternative route to cover such conduct: the coordination 
rules. Federal law treats coordinated expenditures as contributions,43 and therefore 
if Super PAC activity is treated as coordinated with a candidate’s activity, then 
Super PACs would no longer be able to raise unlimited contributions. If the Super 
                                                                                                    
41 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“Citizens United has not made direct contributions to 
candidates, and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether contribution limits 
should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
42 The Court did tantalizingly suggest that things might be different in analysis of large, soft money 
contributions. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (“The BCRA record establishes that certain 
donations to political parties, called “soft money,” were made to gain access to elected officials. 
This case, however, is about independent expenditures, not soft money.”)  It is not clear how to 
reconcile this part of Citizens United with the rest of the opinion. 
43 Federal law defines “contributions” to include “expenditures made by any person in cooperation, 
consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate.” 2 U.S.C. § 
441a(a)(7)(B)(i); see Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 919-20 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 11 C.F.R. § 109.21; 
Smith, supra note 13, at 607-08. 
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PAC and candidate sit down and discuss strategy, the two entities are coordinating 
and the coordination rules apply. Unfortunately for those of us who support Super 
PAC contribution limits, the coordination route appears even less promising than 
the anticorruption argument for sustaining such limits. 
Basically, the coordination route posits that the overlapping personal and 
personnel connections between a candidate’s committee and a single-candidate 
reliable Super PAC justify treating contributions to the Super PAC as coordinated 
with the candidate’s committee, and therefore subject to the individual 
contribution limits. 
For example, here is the coordination approach of the proposed American 
Anti-Corruption Act (AACA),44 which has been promoted by former FEC 
Chairman Trevor Potter, Professor Larry Lessig, and others: 
 
PROVISION 7: REVISE THE FEC’S COORDINATION 
REGULATIONS 
 
The FEC’s current coordination regulations, located at 11 C.F.R. § 109.21, 
permit extensive collaboration between candidates and supposedly 
“independent” Super PACs. 
 
§ Amend the Federal Election Campaign Act, by adding at § 431(17)(C), 
the following:  
 
In order for an expenditure to be considered an independent expenditure, 
the organization paying for the expenditure must act totally independently 
of any candidate or political party. This includes, but is not limited to, 
requirements that the person making the expenditure may not employ or 
retain any individual or accept any assistance, including the solicitation of 
funds, from any individual who is the candidate benefited by such 
expenditure, or who has, with respect to the candidate benefited by such 
expenditure, within the last 5 years (1) raised funds for the candidate; (2) 
been employed or retained by the candidate or candidate’s campaign(s) or 
the congressional office or committee staff of a Member of Congress or 
the Executive office of the President; (3) been employed or retained by a 
national political party committee of the political party of the candidate; 
(4) been employed or retained by a vendor employed or retained by the 
candidate, candidate’s campaign(s), or candidate’s party committee of that 
candidate to act in a fundraising, polling, media consultant, or campaign 
                                                                                                    
44 See Anticorruptionact.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). The text of the Act is posted at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.unitedrepublic.org/docs/AACA_Full_Provisions.pdf.  
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management capacity; or is (5) a spouse, partner, or relative of the 
candidate (father, mother, sister, brother, child, first cousin, aunt, uncle) 
(6) a current or former business partner or colleague of the candidate or of 
an employee of the candidate’s campaign. Additionally, if a candidate 
publicly or privately endorses or approves of an organization’s expenditure 
benefiting that candidate or any of the organization’s activities, then the 
expenditures of such organization shall be deemed coordinated with such 
candidate. 
 
Here is Professor Richard Briffault’s coordination proposal:45 
 
I propose that for any organization that (i) focuses all of its 
electioneering expenditures on one or a very small number of candidates, 
and (ii) either is staffed by individuals who used to work for the candidate, 
the candidate’s campaign committee, or a political party in the current or 
past election cycle; has received fundraising support from a candidate, the 
candidate’s campaign, or staff; or has been publicly endorsed by the 
candidate as a vehicle for supporting that candidate, that organization is to 
be treated as a coordinated organization with that candidate or candidates, 
and its spending treated as coordinated spending with that of the candidate 
or candidates it supports.  
 
 The problem with both the AACA and the Briffault proposals is that they 
reach much more broadly than actual coordination. For example, the AACA 
would effectively bar Super PACs desiring to employ anyone who has worked for 
any member of Congress (not just the supported candidate) for the last five years. 
More broadly, the AACA is targeting Super PACs which employ anyone who is 
politically active or any relative, former colleague, or former donor to a candidate. 
This definition really has nothing to do with coordination and is instead simply a 
way to put single-candidate (and many other) Super PACs out of business. 
 Supporters of AACA might defend the broad coordination standard as a 
prophylactic means to prevent those with close personal relationships to a 
candidate from using those connections to surreptitiously coordinate on strategy. 
The problem with that argument is that actual coordination is unnecessary to 
achieve the aims of supporting the candidate and there is no need for those with a 
personal relationship to the candidate to risk a felony. All of the information that a 
Super PAC needs to be an effective proxy for a campaign is public, and nothing 
                                                                                                    
45 Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 97 (2013), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Briffault-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-88-
2013.pdf.  
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depends on the personal relationship. As election lawyer Bob Bauer notes, “why 
do [candidates and Super PAC employees] have to have known each other when 
they can read websites and tweets?”46 
Briffault’s proposal is narrower than the AACA’s proposal, and there is no 
question Briffault is right that a single-candidate Super PAC will share a common 
purpose with a candidate’s campaign. He explains the basis for his proposal:47 
 
The thrust of the first factor is that if a committee is devoting all of 
its election spending to promoting a specific candidate—whether with 
affirmative ads or attacks on that candidate’s opponent—then donations to 
that committee are effectively donations to the candidate. If an 
organization is involved in multiple election contests, then donations to 
the organization cannot be said to go to the aid of a specific candidate. In 
that case, although the organization’s spending may benefit certain 
candidates, the link between a particular donor and a particular candidate 
is attenuated. But where the organization is a single-candidate committee, 
the connection between donor and ultimate beneficiary is much stronger, 
and the donation begins to resemble Buckley’s “disguised contribution.”… 
The second factor addresses the concern that it is possible for a 
committee to be formed by a truly independent group of concerned 
citizens to advance just one candidate, but also to stress particular issues, 
concerns, or campaign themes that differ from those of the supported 
candidate. Even though focused solely on a single candidate in a specific 
election, such a group might still fit the model the Supreme Court sought 
to protect in Buckley. But the involvement in the committee of individuals 
with recent ties to the candidate or the endorsement of the committee’s 
work by the candidate or his staff indicates that the committee is very 
likely to act consistently with the preferred strategies, tactics, messages, 
and themes of the candidate and to act as an alter ego for the candidate’s 
official campaign even without the explicit interactions that the law 
currently looks for. The ties that indicate that a committee is not truly 
independent of a candidate would include having staff who recently 
worked for the candidate, either on her campaign or in her government 
office; who recently worked for a committee of that candidate’s party; who 
raised funds for a current or recent campaign of that candidate; or who 
                                                                                                    
46 Robert F. Bauer, Professor Briffault on Super PACs and the Question of “Coordination,” MORE 
SOFT MONEY HARD LAW, May 8, 2013, 
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/05/professor-briffault-on-super-pacs-and-the-
question-of-coordination/.  
47 Briffault, supra note 45, at 97-99. 
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recently worked for a vendor who provides campaign services to the 
candidate. A committee that exists solely to promote one or a very small 
number of candidates and is organized and operated by individuals with 
recent strong political ties to that candidate or candidates is very likely to 
be viewed by the candidate or candidates aided as providing integral 
support to their campaigns even in the absence of express current 
interaction between the independent committee and the candidate. Under 
those circumstances, it would be fair to say that donations to that 
committee should be treated as disguised contributions to the candidate. 
Similarly, even without the use of overlapping staff, if the 
candidate or his committee endorses or approves of an organization’s 
campaign activities on his behalf, calls on donors to give to that 
committee, participates in fundraising activities for it, or otherwise signals 
support for the organization’s campaign work, that, too, indicates that the 
candidate considers the committee to be a part of his campaign. Even in 
the absence of substantive discussions about campaign strategy, 
involvement in decisions about advertising messages, or transmission of 
inside information, the candidate’s endorsement of the organization’s 
work indicates that the candidate and committee are acting in concert to 
promote the candidate’s election… 
 
The problem with Briffault’s analysis is his apparent conflation of 
coordination with common purpose. As Professor Brad Smith persuasively argues, 
Buckley’s understanding of coordination focuses on coordination of campaign 
strategy, and not simply the closeness of the prior or current relationship among 
different individuals or groups.48 A rule which would count as coordination the 
simple fact that people have common goals and common histories would go well 
beyond the coordination prohibition aimed at barring disguised contributions to a 
candidate through a third party. In other words, to show coordination, it is not 
enough to prove that the Super PAC acts “consistently” with the candidate’s 
views or even “as an alter ego;” coordination requires proof of “the explicit 
interactions that the law currently looks for.”49 A coordination rule which does not 
require explicit interactions appears to violate the First Amendment. 
 Briffault is on stronger grounds arguing for a rule which treats candidates 
who urge donors to give to the Super PAC as coordinating with that Super PAC. 
A candidate who raises funds for a group by definition is coordinating fundraising 
strategy with that group; the candidate is taking time raising funds for the group 
                                                                                                    
48 Smith, supra note 13, at 630-35. 
49 Briffault, supra note 45, at 98. 
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rather than himself. Even Smith seems to agree that treating this activity as 
coordination would be constitutional under existing doctrine.50 
 It is no doubt true that Super PACs with close personal or personnel ties to 
the candidate can create a public perception of undue influence over that 
candidate. Briffault is surely right that “when a committee exists solely to support 
a specific candidate and either is organized and directed by individuals with close 
political ties to the candidate or is recognized as a supporter by the candidate, 
donors to the committee pose the same dangers of corruption and the appearance 
of corruption as donations to the candidate’s official campaign committee.”51 
Indeed, I would argue that reliable Super PACs create nearly the identical actual 
undue influence problem, which arises as well when a donor makes large 
campaign contributions directly to candidates. But, as we have seen, this idea of 
creating undue influence through outside groups is in tension with the crabbed 
definition of corruption and the appearance of corruption under the Citizen 
United. And regardless, undue influence, as bad as it may be, is not coordination. 
They are analytically distinct concepts. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The doctrinal move to an expanded definition of coordination to deal with 
the problem of Super PACs is completely understandable. But given the state of 
current doctrine, the effort would be unlikely to be successful. Courts would be 
likely, for reasons explained by Smith, to reject a broad coordination rule as 
infringing on the First Amendment rights of those involved with independent 
Super PACs. 
 Instead, coordination is the sideshow and the fight over the meaning of 
corruption is the main event. Reformers must convince the Supreme Court to 
return to the broader definition of corruption which extends anticorruption to 
include not just the prevention of bribery but also the prevention of undue 
influence. That day may not come until the Supreme Court personnel changes, but 
it is the linchpin for the successful resuscitation of meaningful campaign finance 
regulation in the United States. 
                                                                                                    
50 Smith, supra note 13, at 635. 
51 Briffault, supra note 45, at 99. 
